State of Utah v. Jesse Andersen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1940
State of Utah v. Jesse Andersen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Edward F. Richards; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Andersen, No. 6300 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/714
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 6300. 
JESS ANDERSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX. 
Page 
Industrial Commission of Utah v. Wasatch Grading 
Company, 80 Utah 223, 14 Pac. (2d) 988_ _____________________________ 19 
State v. Gesas, 49 Utah 181, 162 Pac. 366 ____________________________________ 6 
State v. Hale, 71 Utah 134, 263 Pac. 86 __________________________________________ 9 
State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 6, 102 Pac. 1000 _______________________________________ 10 
State v. Jessup, _______ Utah _________ , 100 Pac. (2d) 969 _______________ 11 
State v. Lingeman, 97 Utah 180, 91 Pac. (2d) 457 _______________ 15 
State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 146 Pac. 300 __________________________________________ 9 
State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 Pac. 987 _________________________________________ 8 
State v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 146 Pac. 306 _______________________ 9 
State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 Pac. 434 _____________________________________________ 12 
Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 80 Utah 138, 13 Pac. 
(2d) 636 ----------------------------·······-·······-··-·························----·························---·· 8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 6300. 
JESS ANDERSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
STATEMENT OF CASE. 
The appellant above named was charged by a com-
plaint in the City Court of Salt Lake City with having 
committed the crime of involuntary manslaughter and 
after a preliminary hearing was bound over to the District 
Court and found guilty by a jury in the District Court. 
He was thereafter sentenced to twelve months in the 
County Jail of Salt Lake County. 
The manslaughter charge arose by reason of an auto-
mobile accident which occurred on the 25th day of Feb-
ruary, 1940, in which accident the automobile operated by 
the appellant collided with an automobile operated by one 
Clark Romney at the intersection of 21st South and Third 
East Street. That the said Clark Romney died the same 
day as a result of said accident. 
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A bill of particulars submitted in the District Court 
contended that the defendant and appellant drove his auto-
mobile at an excessive rate of speed, to-wit, forty miles 
an hour, and failed to stop at a stop sign located on the 
south side of 21st South Street at its intersection with 
Third East Street. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The accident occurred at approximately 7:00 A. M. 
on the morning of February 25, 1940, and was observed 
by Alex Ingstrom and Kenneth H. Silcox (Tr. 71, Abst. 
11; Tr. 95, Abst. 17). Both of these witnesses testi-
fied that they saw both cars approach the intersection of 
Third East and 21st South and Mr. Ingstrom estimated 
the speed of the Ford at between forty and forty-five miles 
per hour (Tr. 72, Abst. 12). Both witnesses mentioned 
contend that both automobiles entered the intersection at 
approximately the same time, or that the Oldsmobile might 
have reached the intersection a little before the Ford, 
which was driven by the defendant (Tr. 88, Abst. 15; Tr. 
96, Abst. 18). These witnesses also stated that the Ford 
struck the Oldsmobile in the center of the car at approxi-
mately the center of the intersection. That the Ford 
stopped almost instantly after the impact but that the 
Oldsmobile went five or six feet in the air, turned over 
twice and came to rest some distance down 21st South on 
the curbing between the sidewalk and the street ( Tr. 73, 
Abst. 12; Tr. 100, Abst. 19). 
Mr. Pierce, the officer investigating the accident, testi-
fied as to the tire marks and location of the automobiles 
when he arrived at the scene of the accident (Tr. 112, 
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Abst. 21). The skid marks coming in from Third East 
Street were forty-four feet in length to the place of im-
pact (Tr. 111, Abst. 21) and that there were also skid 
marks in the shape of an arc of approximately twenty-six 
feet which indicated that the Ford had been swung around 
(Tr. 114, Abst. 22). He then testified that by using 
a certain formula and taking the condition of the high-
way into consideration, if the Ford car had come to a stop 
at the point of impact, it would have been traveling when 
the brakes were applied 30.35 miles per hour (Tr. 120, 
Abst. 24). 
A Mr. Taylor, who claimed to be an expert, testified in 
his opinion after explaining certain formulas and the use 
thereof that at the time the Ford applied the brakes, it 
was travelling at 59.3 miles per hour (Tr. 175-178, Abst. 
41-43), and that the Oldsmobile was travelling 37 miles 
per hour (Tr. 180, Abst. 44). 
The defendant in a statement made to Officer Pierce 
stated that he was going about 35 or 40 miles an hour 
when he approached 21st South and was almost to the 
intersection before he noticed the stop sign. That he did 
not know that the stop sign was there and that he 
applied his brakes and tried to stop but skidded into the 
other car (Tr. 130, Abst. 27). The facts also disclosed 
that the man in the Oldsmobile was thrown from the car 
and that he and his automobile came to rest approxi-
mately seventy-eight feet from the point of collision. 
Evidence was also introduced by Foster Kunz, Traffic 
Safety Engineer of the State Road Commission of Utah, 
that 21st South Street, near the vicinity of Third East 
Street, was under the jurisdiction of the Road Commis-
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sion and that the stop sign on the south side of 21st South 
and on the west side of Third East Street was placed there 
by direction of the State Road Commission (Tr. 210-215, 
Abst. 56-58) . 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON. 
1. Failure of the Court to quash the information 
(Assignment of Error No. 1). 
2. Failure of the Court to require plaintiff to furnish 
further bill of particulars (Assignment of Error No. 2). 
3. Failure of the Court to require the state to elect 
upon which ground of manslaughter it would rely (Assign-
ment of Error No. 3) . 
4. Failure of the Court to direct a verdict in favor 
of the defendant (Assignment of Error No. 4). 
5. Failure of the Court to grant defendant's motion 
for new trial (Assignment of Error No. 5). 
6. Failure of the Court to grant defendant's motion 
in arrest of judgment (Assignment of Error No. 6). 
~ 7. The Court erred in introduction of evidence and 
fA.t./''h'f. c.o 
iJVtSustaini:Hg defendant's objection to numerous questions 
asked (Assignments of Error Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11). 
8. The Court erred in giving erroneous instructions 
to the jury (Assignments of Error Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30). 
9. The Court erred in refusing to give certain of 
defendant's requested instructions (Assignments of Error 
Nos. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38). 
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STATEMENT OF PARTICULAR QUESTIONS 
INVOLVED. 
1. The complaint in this matter does not charge a 
crime nor does it state facts sufficient to advise the de-
fendant the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him. 
2. That the defendant did not have a preliminary 
hearing and he did not waive the same. 
3. That the district attorney had no authority to file 
the information in this cause. 
4. That the information did not advise the defendant 
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 
5. That where a crime is charged in the conjunctive 
a conviction may not be had thereon unless the crime was 
the result of both acts charged. 
6. A hypothetical question must be based on facts 
actually proven or on observations made by the expert 
himself, or both. 
7. Instructions which go beyond the pleadings and 
stipulated issues of a case are erroneous. 
8. Erroneous giving and refusal to give instructions. 
9. Insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. 
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ARGUMENT. 
I. 
The Complaint Does Not Charge a Crime nor Does it Statf 
Facts Sufficient to Advise the Defendant of the Nature 
and Cause of the Accusation Against Him. 
The complaint filed by the county attorney and upon 
which the defendant was supposed to have had a pre-
liminary hearing stated in the charging part thereof as 
follows: 
"* * * That Jesse Anderson on the 25th day 
of February, A. D. 1940, at the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, did commit the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter as follows, to-wit: Jess Anderson killed 
Clark Romney without malice, contrary to the pro-
visions of the statute of the state aforesaid in such 
cases made and provided and against the peace and 
dignity of the State of Utah." 
This does not state sufficient facts to charge the defendant 
with involuntary manslaughter, or any other crime in ac-
cordance with the rule and holding of this court in the 
case of State v. Gesas, 49 Utah, 181, 162 Pac. 366, which 
case holds: 
"The defendant is charged with involuntary man-
slaughter under a statute which merely states the of-
fense in the most general terms. Under that statute 
a person may be guilty of a large variety of things 
which may ultimately result in the crime of in-
voluntary manslaughter. The information in this 
case, we think, comes within subdivision 3 of section 
4732, supr>a, which requires that 'the particular cir-
cumstances of the offense' must be stated 'when they 
are necessary to constitute a complete offense'. As 
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the information now stands, the defendant is not 
charged with having committed or omitted any par-
ticular thing which caused the death of the deceased. 
Nothing in that regard is alleged save the conclusions 
of the pleader. The pleader certainly must have had 
in mind some act or some omission on the part of the 
defendant which caused, or directly contributed to, the 
death of the deceased. What is that act or omission? 
What is the defendant required to meet? What act 
or omission is he to explain or controvert? We con-
fess that we are entirely unable to discover any par-
ticular act or omission that the defendant is called on 
to defend against. * * *" 
Nor does the complaint charge a crime under what is 
termed our short form law, for under Section 103-28-5, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, manslaughter, whether 
voluntary or involuntary, is the unlawful killing of a 
human being without malice, and the short form informa-
tion or complaint suggested in Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 
1935, is as follows : 
"A.B. unlawfully killed C.D." 
while in this case the word "unlawfully" has been entirely 
omitted from the complaint. 
Can we say that by the conclusion of the pleader in 
using the words "involuntary manslaughter", he has sup-
plied the necessary requirements required under Section 
12, Article 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and 
Section 105-1-8, Sub. 2, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, or 
even the short form statute? Had the pleader merely said 
that the defendant had committed the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter, there might be some merit to this con-
tention. 
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However, even though our laws of 1935 provide that 
a crime may be charged by the use of a common law or 
statutory name, we feel that where the crime may be com-
mitted in two or more different ways, such as involuntary 
manslaughter, the pleader is not then justified under our 
constitutional provision and under Section 105-1-8, Sub. 2, 
to merely set forth the name of the crime. In this case, 
however, the pleader did not stop with the words "in-
voluntary manslaughter" but continued by specific alle-
gations to tell us how the death o·ccurred and by such 
words it is clearly shown that this defendant committed no 
crime. Therefore, either the conclusion of the pleader was 
erroneous and not based upon pleaded facts, or the general 
allegation that he committed the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter is in conflict with the specific allegations alleged 
in the complaint, and where specific allegations are in con-
flict with general allegations, the specific allegations will 
control. 
Thomas v. 0{Jiden State Bank, et ,al., 80 Utah 138, 13 
Pac. (2d) 636: 
"* * * It is a familiar rule in pleading that 
general allegations are controlled by special alle-
gations inconsistent therewith. State v. Rolio, 71 
Utah 91, 262 Pac. 987, 49 C. J. 119." 
State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 Pac. 987: 
"* * * If a plaintiff, after alleging title in gen-
eral terms, attempts to set out the facts or source of 
his title by specific averments, ordinarily the latter 
may be regarded as controlling the former, especially 
if the latter are inconsistent with the former." 
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II. 
The District Attorney Had No Authority to Issue an 
Information and the Court Had No Jurisdiction 
in the Matter. 
We assume that there is no question that if the com-
plaint upon which the defendant had his alleged prelim-
inary hearing did not state a crime, there was no pre-
liminary hearing. In the case of Sbate v. Sheffield, 45 
Utah 426, 146 Pac. 306, the Court stated: 
"Under the Constitution and the statutes of this 
state, a preliminary examination, unless waived by the 
accused with the consent of the state, is a prerequisite 
to a prosecution by information. A verified complaint 
or an affidavit before a mALgistrate charging the ac-
cused with a public offense is essential to the ex-
amination. Without it the power of the magistrate to 
act is not judicially invoked." (Italics ours.) 
See also State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 146 Pac. 300; State v. 
Hale, 71 Utah 134, 263 Pac. 86. 
And it has been well settled in this jurisdiction that 
before the district attorney can issue an information and 
the district court take jurisdiction of a case, the defendant 
must either have a preliminary hearing or have waived 
the same and also that the offense charged in the infor-
mation must be the same offense as was charged in the 
complaint. 
State v. Hale, supra, states as follows: 
"This court has repeatedly held that an accused, 
if he objects, may not be tried in the district court 
upon an information unless he has either had a pre-
liminary examination, or, with the consent of the 
state, has waived a preliminary examination of the 
offense charged. State v. Jensen, 36 Utah, 166, 96 P. 
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1085; State v. Hob.en, 36 Utah, 186, 102 P. 1000; State 
v. P.ay, 45 Utah, 411, 146 P. 300, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 
173; State v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 462, 146 P. 306; State 
v. Nelson, 52 Utah, 617, 176 P. 860. If in the instant 
case a preliminary examination had been held and evi-
dence offered tending to show that the defendant 
treated one of the seven persons concerning which evi-
dence was offered at the trial, could the state, in such 
case, properly try, over objection, the defendant for 
treating any one of such other six persons? Clearly 
such procedure is condemned by the cases last above 
cited." 
In State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 6, 102 Pac. 1000, the Court 
stated: 
"* * * It was with respect to the offense of 
April, 1906, and to the transactions out of which it 
arose, that defendant was given his constitutional 
privilege of a preliminary hearing. The district at-
torney, in the information, charged him with the of-
fense growing out of that transaction. He could not 
legally charge him with any other." 
In this case, where the complaint before the magis-
trate entirely failed to state a crime, then of course if the 
district attorney charged a crime in his information, he 
would have to charge a different crime than that upon 
which the defendant had a preliminary hearing. 
III. 
The Information Did Not Advise the Defendant of the 
Nature and Cause of the Accusation Against Him. 
The information which is set forth in full at pages 2 
and 3 of the abstract, like the complaint, does not advise 
the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him as required by our constitution and the laws 
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of this state unless again we can say that the mere use of 
the words "involuntary manslaughter" describes the crime, 
for after such a conclusion the district attorney has 
alleged: 
"That on the 25th day of February, A. D. 1940, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant 
Jesse Anderson did unlawfully and without malice kill 
Clark Romney." 
Let us assume for argument that such a statement is 
sufficient to charge under our statute the crime of man-
slaughter for these words are the exact definition of man-
slaughter set forth in Section 103-28-5, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933. The information still does not advise the 
defendant except for the conclusion above mentioned 
whether he is charged with voluntary or involuntary man-
slaughter and under this point we respectfully submit that 
the argument and authorities in relation to the fact that 
general allegations are controlled by special or specific 
allegations is the same as set forth under our argument 
concerning the complaint before the magistrate. As this 
court has held in numerous cases and particularly in the 
case of State v. Jessup, _________ Utah _________ , 100 Pac. (2d) 969, 
that a bill of particulars cannot cure a defect in either a 
complaint or an information, we respectfully submit that 
the defendant in this case should have been advised in the 
information sufficient facts to determine whether he was 
being charged with voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, 
whether the same was committed while he was in the com-
mission of a lawful act which might produce death in an 
unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspec-
tion, and that the bill of particulars at the most could only 
furnish details concerning one of these charges. 
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IV. 
A Crime Charged in the Conjunctive Must be Proved 
in the Conjunctive. 
In this case in the bill of particulars submitted to the 
defendant under the paragraph marked "Means" and which 
is set forth on pages 5 and 6 of the Abstract, the district 
attorney stated that the defendant was driving said auto-
mobile at a speed in excess of forty miles an hour, which 
speed was dangerous and excessive and that said Jesse 
Anderson did not stop at a stop sign facing south on Third 
East Street and that as a result of said acts the death of 
Clark Romney was caused. 
The issues in this case were also limited by the stipu-
lation of the Assistant District Attorney Mr. Roberts when 
he stated to the court as follows: 
"In that case, Your Honor, the State will not 
prove any acts except as stated; that is, excessive 
speed and going through a stop sign." (Trans. 28, 
Abst. 7.) 
In the case of State of Utah v. ~ance, 38 Utah 1, 110 
Pac. 434, the defendant there was charged with having 
committed murder by poisoning and beating and this court 
held as follows: 
"* * * There is one, and only one, ground upon 
which the court's ruling in denying appellant's second 
motion can be sustained, which is that the pleader in 
the third count stated but a single means as causing 
the death of the deceased, namely, the co-operation of 
two distinct causes which produced the mortal sick-
ness from which it is alleged the deceased languished 
and finally died. The pleader had a right to accuse 
appellant of having used one, two, or more means, or 
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of causing death by applying two distinct means as 
co-operating causes, the joint effect of which produced 
death. As we have seen, the pleader could have 
availed himself of charging all these means by plead-
ing in a certain way. He did not choose to do so, but 
specifically alleged that the appellant committed an 
assault upon the deceased and used certain means on 
one day, and that he committed another assault and 
applied certain other means on another day, and that 
the effect of the means so described co-operating to-
gether produced a mortal sickness which caused death. 
The effect of the allegations in the third count is that 
the two causes, one arising from the beating and 
bruising and the other from the administering of the 
poison, co-operating together, produced death. This 
being so, the court was right in not requiring the 
state to elect, since in legal effect there was but one 
cause of death alleged, namely, the joint effect of the 
beating and bruising co-operating with the effect pro-
duced by the poisoning. It is also clearly shown by 
the record that the trial proceeded upon this theory. 
The physicians testified that death did not result from 
either the beating alone, or from the effects of the 
poison alone, but that it was caused by the co-operat-
ing influence of the effects of both, and this thus con-
stituted but a single, and the real, cause of death. 
This, in legal effect, is just what was charged as the 
means of death in the third count. But, notwith-
standing this, the court ruled and instructed the jury 
that they could find the appellant guilty if they be-
lieved from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the deceased died from the effects of the beating 
and bruising and kicking alone, or from the effects of 
the poison alone, or from the combined effects of both. 
As we have seen, this charge might have been proper 
if the information had been different, but, in view of 
the language contained in the third count of the in-
formation, there was no distinct charge left upon 
which to base a finding that death was caused except 
from the co-operating causes, which in and of itself 
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excluded the charge that either one of those causes 
produced, or could have produced, death. The court 
therefore erred in charging the jury as aforesaid." 
The court, however, in this case disregarded the fact that 
the pleadings had been plead in the conjunctive and gave 
instructions Nos. 5, 6 and 6-a, which did not limit the jury 
to the pleadings. The court also refused to give defend-
ants requested instructions Nos. 1 and 2, both of which 
instructions required the jury to find that the defendant 
had driven his automobile in excess of forty miles an hour 
and had failed to stop at the stop sign. We feel that the 
giving of the instructions numerated and the refusal to 
give those just mentioned is contrary to the decision above 
quoted and is error upon which a new trial must be 
granted. 
v. 
A Hypoth.etical Question Must be Based on Facts Actually 
Proven or on Objections Made by the Expert 
Himself or Both. 
It is the contention of the appellant that the Court 
erred in overruling the objection to the hypothetical ques-
tion asked of Mr. Taylor which appears as Assignment No. 
9 and is set forth in Abstract 38 and 39, Transcript 169 
and 171, and also appears at pages 83 and 84 of the ab-
stract. The objection made to this long hypothetical ques-
tion besides it being incompetent, irrelevant and imma-
terial, was that certain elements in the evidence had not 
been taken into consideration and that the witness had 
taken certain matters into consideration which had not 
been introduced in evidence and of which the witness did 
not have personal knowledge. 
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It is apparent from a cross examination of Mr. Taylor 
that he took into consideration in answering his question 
certain information given to him by Mr. Pierce and also 
that he had read statements made by witnesses to the 
police officer. These statements were not introduced in 
evidence. As to the consideration of such statements in 
expressing his opinion see Abstract page 43, Transcript 
178, where the witness stated: 
"The opinion I have given is taking into consid-
eration certain information Mr. Pierce gave to me at 
some other time. I read the statement of the wit-
nesses he has in his police report and that is where I 
got my facts from with the exception of the facts Mr. 
Rawlings has shown on the board and my own ob-
servations.'" 
This court held in the case of State v. Lingeman, 97 
Utah 180, 91 Pac. (2) 457, as follows: 
"* * * Experts may give answer to such ques-
tions both on their own observations as a foundation 
or on evidence adduced from other sources which may 
for the purposes of the question be assumed as facts. 
Wilson v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 82 Utah 224, 
234, 23 P. (2d) 921; Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Vaughan, 
6 Cir., 71 F. (2d) 394, certiorari denied, 293 U. S. 
589, 55 S. Ct. 104, 79 L. Ed. 684; M onark Battery Co. 
v. lndustrml Commission, 354 Ill. 494, 188 N. E. 413; 
Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 383, 217 N. W. 329, 
57 A. L. R. 262; Hester v. Forr.d, 221 Ala. 592, 130 So. 
203; Wolczek v. Public Service Co., 342 Ill. 482, 498, 
17 4 N. E. 577 ; Trewdwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 228 
P. 25; Wigmore, op. cit. Sec. 652. But experts cannot 
give an opinion on matters not observed by them or 
not in evidence by the testimony of others. We have 
discussed with perhaps too much particularity the 
claimed omissions and intrusions of facts claimed not 
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to be in evidence. We do not consider it necessary to 
further discuss this question, save to advance the 
admonition that the court and counsel should be care-
ful to see that a hypothetical question presents or as-
sumes no fact that is not in evidence; that it does pre-
sent all facts or elements necessary to the determi-
nation to be made by the witness, or to enable him 
properly to form an expert opinion; and that no ma-
terial element or fact is used by the witness in his 
determinations that is not presented in the question 
as asked." 
Again the witness stated on cross examination that he 
based his opinion on how the street appeared when he saw 
it and not how it was at the time of the accident. It is 
therefore apparent from both of these statements that the 
witness may have taken into consideration numerous ele-
ments and items of which the defendant was not advised 
and upon which he had no right of cross examination. 
VI. 
Instructions Which Go Beyond the Evidence and 
Pleadings Are Erroneous. 
As has heretofore been indicated, the pleadings limit 
the acts which the defendant committed and upon which 
the state relied in order to prove their charge of invol-
untary manslaughter to operating an automobile at an ex-
cessive rate of speed, to-wit, forty miles an hour, and 
failing to stop at a stop sign. The court, however, in in-
structing the jury, disregarded the allegations set forth 
in the bill of particulars and the limitations placed upon 
the state by its stipulation made at the time a further bill 
of particulars was requested, for the court instructed the 
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jury in its instruction No. 5 that the laws of the state of 
Utah in force at the time of the accident were as follows : 
"Instruction No. 5. 
You are instructed that the laws of the State of 
Utah in force on the 25th day of February, 1940, pro-
vide as follows : 
First: That it shall be unlawful for any person 
to drive any vehicle upon any highway carelessly and 
heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights 
and safety of others. 
Second: That it shall be unlawful for any per-
son to drive any vehicle upon any highway without 
due caution and circumspection and at such a speed 
or in such a manner as to endanger any person or 
property. 
Third: That it shall be unlawful for any person 
to drive any vehicle upon any highway at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent, having due 
regard for the traffic, surface and width of the high-
way and the hazards at intersections, and any other 
condition then existing. 
Fourth: That it shall be unlawful for any per-
son to drive any vehicle upon any highway at a speed 
which is greater than will permit the driver to exer-
cise proper control of the vehicle and to decrease 
speed or to stop, as may be necessary, to avoid collid-
ing with any person, vehicle or other conveyance upon 
or entering the highway in compliance with the legal 
requirements and with the duty of drivers and other 
persons using the highway, to exercise due care. 
Fifth : That it shall be unlawful for any person 
to fail to stop in obedience to a stop sign, bearing the 
words 'Stop' in letters of a size to be clearly legible 
from a distance of one hundred feet, placed at an in-
tersection, which said stop sign is placed there by the 
State Road Commission or by the local authority hav-
ing said intersection under its jurisdiction. 
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You are further instructed that anyone violating 
any of the provisions of law as set forth above is 
guilty of the commission of an unlawful act not 
amounting to a felony." 
By this instruction and numerous others, namely, In-
struction No. 6 and particularly paragraph 2 thereof, the 
court has instructed the jury that if they find that the 
defendant violated the provisions of the law as set forth in 
such a manner as to evince marked disregard for the 
safety of others, he could be found guilty of manslaughter. 
Also, Instruction 6-a is a general charge and does not 
limit the jury to the pleadings. These instructions would 
give the jury the right to speculate on numerous grounds 
of recklessness not set forth in the bill of particulars nor 
included under the stipulation entered into. For instance, 
paragraph 4 of Instruction No. 5 would permit them to 
find that in case the defendant drove at a speed which is 
greater than would permit the driver to exercise proper 
control of the vehicle or to decrease the speed or stop as 
may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person or 
vehicle would be sufficient, whereas, the bill of particulars 
and the stipulation entered into limited to the pleadings 
that the speed must be in excess of forty miles an hour. 
Likewise, the general statement made in paragraph 2 of 
Instruction No. 5 would leave to the jury to determine 
whether the defendant drove his car without due caution 
and circumspection, regardless of whether he violated any 
speed law or failed to stop at the stop sign. The same 
criticism can be made of each and every paragraph in In· 
struction No. 5 and to each instruction contending that a 
violation of the law set forth in Instruction No. 5 could 
be considered as recklessness, nor is there any evidence to 
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support such instructions regardless of the pleadings as 
the only evidence introduced went merely to prove either 
the failure to stop at the stop sign or the speed at which 
the car was travelling. 
This court has held in the case of Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah v. Wasatch Grading Company, 80 Utah 223, 
14 Pac. (2d) 988, as follows: 
"* * * It is a well-established rule of law in 
this, as well as other jurisdictions, that the acts of 
negligence relied upon by the plaintiff for a recovery 
must be both alleged and proved. It is reversible 
error to instruct the jury that they may find a verdict 
for a plaintiff because of some negligence which is not 
pleaded or which is without support in the evidence. 
Smith v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 35 Utah 390, 
100 P. 673; Macky v. Bingham New Haven Copper & 
Gold M. Co., 54 Utah 171, 180 P. 416; Martindale v. 
Oregon Short L. R. Co., 48 Utah 464, 160 Pac. 275; 
Kendall v. Fordham, (Utah) 9 P. (2d) 183." 
VII. 
The Court Permitted Error in Giving Instructions and in 
Its Refusal to Give Defendant's Requested Instructions. 
As we have heretofore indicated, the court in giving 
Instructions 5, 6 and 6-a, has permitted the jury to specu-
late on grounds of recklessness other than those charged 
in the information or furnished by the bill of particulars. 
The court also erred in refusing to give defendant's re-
quested instruction No. 7 which sets forth the speed laws 
governing the territory in question. It was error for the 
court to refuse to give such instruction after it was stipu-
lated between counsel that the south line of 21st South 
Street is the end of Salt Lake City limits and that the land 
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lying south of that line is in Salt Lake County (Tr. 206, 
Abst. 64), for with this stipulation and with no evidence 
having been introduced by the state that any different 
speed limit was posted for Third East Street south of 21st 
South, the defendant certainly was entitled to operate his 
automobile at the rate of 50 miles per hour when the evi-
dence clearly shows that it was early in the morning and 
that there was no other traffic upon the highway, and the 
jury should have been instructed in this regard as re-
quested. 
We have already mentioned the error committed by 
the Court in refusing to give defendant's requested In-
structions Nos. 1 and 2. 
Defendant also respectfully submits that his requested 
Instructions Nos. 9, 10 and 12 properly set forth the law 
in regards to what acts must be done by defendant before 
he may be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. We 
contend that even though the court has in his Instructions 
Nos. 8, 8-a and 9 attempted to cover this feature, the 
court has not gone to the extent it should have and to the 
extent that the defendant requested in his instructions. 
VIII. 
Insufficiency of Evidence to Support the Verdict. 
It is the contention of the defendant that the evidence 
will not support the verdict for involuntary manslaughter. 
In this regard we must keep in mind that mere negligence 
or carelessness is insufficient and as stated in the case of 
Stat,e v. Lingeman, supra, it is necessary to show criminal 
negligence, that is, reckless conduct or conduct evincing 
a marked disregard for the safety of others. The only 
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facts that we have in this case are that the defendant did 
go through a stop sign, he stating however (Tr. 130, 
Abst. 27), "I was driving about 35 or 40 miles per hour 
as I approached 21st South. I was almost to the intersec-
tion when I noticed the stop sign. I did not know there 
was a stop sign until I saw it. I applied my brakes and 
tried to stop but I skidded into the other car." 
Certainly one cannot say that because a person fails 
to see a stop sign that this is evidence of marked disregard 
for the safety of others, particularly when the accident 
happened early in the morning and there was no other 
traffic upon the highway and the defendant was entitled 
so far as the evidence shows to have been driving his car 
at a rate of approximately fifty miles an hour. The only 
other ground of recklessness or negligence upon which the 
defendant can be convicted is that of speed. It is true that 
the expert, Mr. Taylor, testified that he was travelling 59.3 
miles per hour when the brakes were applied (Tr. 178, 
Abst. 43). As we have already pointed out, the testi-
mony of Mr. Taylor in our opinion is speculative and based 
on facts not within the record and was improperly ad-
mitted. Contrary to the evidence of Mr. Taylor we have 
the statement of the defendant heretofore mentioned, the 
testimony of Mr. Kenneth H. Silcox (Tr. 96, Abst. 18) 
that the defendant was going about forty miles an hour, 
and the testimony of Alex Engstrom that the defendant 
was travelling between forty and forty-five miles an hour 
(Tr. 72, Abst. 12). 
Can we say therefore that merely because a man is 
travelling at, say 45 miles an hour, when there is no other 
traffic upon the highway, he is showing marked disregard 
for the rights and safety of others and because he fails to 
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see a stop sign that he is guilty of criminal negligence and 
should be deprived of his freedom? 
The question would be different if the highways had 
been crowded or if the defendant had seen the stop sign 
and because he was in a hurry had wilfully gone through 
the same. 
We therefore respectfully submit that a verdict should 
have been directed in favor of the defendant in this case; 
that the errors assigned by the defendant are reversible 
errors and that the Court should have granted a motion 
for new trial or a motion in arrest of judgment, and that 
this Court should now set aside the judgment and verdict 
rendered in this cause. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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